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Abstract: A low-carbon policy attracts the interests of businesses, consumers, and policy makers.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how a carbon labelling scheme could be integrated
into operational decision-making for manufacturers and retailers. Three game theoretic models
of a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer are built to investigate a manufacturer
and retailer’s pricing and investment decision for products with different initial carbon footprints
considering consumer environmental awareness. Through a systematic comparison and numerical
analysis, the results show that a carbon labelling scheme can significantly reduce the overall carbon
emission supply chain and have an initially negative impact on the manufacturer and retailer’s
profits. However, in the medium–long run, manufacturers and retailers could yet achieve profitability
through continuously investing in low-carbon technology.
Keywords: carbon labelling scheme; supply chain; product carbon footprint (PCF); consumer
environmental awareness; game theory
1. Introduction
With growing concerns over greenhouse gases (GHGs) and environmental pollution in recent
years, many countries have enacted diverse legislations such as carbon taxes, carbon cap and trade
programmes, environmental labelling, or eco-labelling schemes to help quell carbon dioxide (CO2)
and other GHG emissions. In addition, with increasing consumers’ environmental awareness, many
companies have started to develop and market products with climate-change credentials to achieve
a competitive and commercial advantage. With those climate-change credentials on the products,
consumers will be able to judge the impact on the environment of what they buy [1]. Firms whose
products possess a credence attribute with a positive environmental benefit may have an incentive to
disclose credence product attributes to achieve product differentiation and potentially increase sales [2].
As one type of eco-label, carbon labels on a product indicate the quantity of greenhouse gas emissions
produced during the full life cycle of that product. These labels have been suggested as an effective
means to not only encouragemanufacturers to reduce CO2 emissions during themanufacturing process
but also to lead the public towards low-carbon consumption to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
mitigate climate change. Therefore, carbon labelling schemes are garnering considerable focus.
Many internationally recognized carbon labelling schemes, most notably the CO2 Measured Label
and the Reducing CO2 Label (UK), the Carbon Counted (Canada), the Carbon Free (US), and the Hong
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Kong Carbon Labelling Scheme (CLS), have been established in recent years [3], and these programmes
are expanding globally [4]. First developed by British Carbon Trust in 2007, a carbon labelling scheme
attempts to communicate relevant carbon footprint information not only to those sourcing organizations
but also to consumers that will eventually contribute to the decision-making process inherent in product
selection and purchasing [5]. The scheme also requires manufacturers to achieve low-carbon production
in the next two years to further reduce the carbon footprint of the products [6].
The objective of carbon labels is to increase the transparency of the product carbon footprint and
facilitate green consumption for consumers and sustainable production for manufacturers. Moreover,
we also know that a carbon labelling scheme may help to reduce the carbon content during the
manufacturing or logistic process before reaching the stores, encourage retailers and manufacturers to
produce or sell fewer carbon-intensive products, and motivate customers to buy products with less
embodied carbon [1]. In other words, this scheme is also an opportunity for organizations to publicly
commit to reducing carbon in their products.
Growing consumer interest in “green products” has led many companies to manufacture and
sell products with environmental attributes. Large retailers have begun to require their suppliers
to clearly label the carbon footprint on their products [7,8]. For example, Walmart has requested its
100,000 suppliers to complete the carbon footprint verification for their products. Products without
carbon labels will not be allowed to enter its procurement systems. Moreover, Walmart applied
different colours of carbon labels on products to clearly grade their carbon footprints [9,10]. To be
qualified for large retailers’ sourcing criteria and to achieve better carbon scores, many suppliers must
consider investing in low-carbon production to reduce the product’s carbon footprint [11]. However,
manufacturers may encounter higher operation costs due to the additional low-carbon investment.
Certain manufacturers continue to use the scores as an important market opportunity and may pass
the low-carbon investment costs on to consumers through retailers. Furthermore, the increasing price
on the low-carbon products may reduce consumers’ purchasing intention [12–14].
In this paper, we develop models to support decision making concerning low-carbon production
with consumers’ environmental awareness and a carbon labelling scheme. This paper provides a more
thorough understanding of the impact of consumers’ environmental awareness on optimal pricing and
profitability between manufacturer and retailer. In particular, we provide insights on the following
research questions:
(1) What is the impact of a carbon labelling scheme on the key decisions of supply chain players?
(2) Considering consumers’ environmental awareness, is it profitable for a manufacturer to invest in
low-carbon production?
(3) If yes, how do the manufacturer and the retailer make decisions (the price and the product carbon
footprint) for the carbon-labelled products?
To answer the above questions, we consider a leader-follower Stackelberg game between one
manufacturer and a retailer. Both sell a single product and attempt to achieve profit maximization
in the market, where consumers are heterogeneous in their attitude towards low-carbon products.
In this set up, the manufacturer and the retailer will both be affected by the carbon labelling scheme,
and the manufacturer must decide if it will invest in low-carbon production to reduce the product
carbon footprint. During this process, low-carbon investment costs will occur. To illustrate, Walmart
as the retailer and Toshiba as the manufacturer are used as examples, where Walmart benefits
from increasing the demand of environmentally sensitive consumers; however, Toshiba bears the
greening cost [15]. Although this setup is considered for simplicity, the assumption enables one to
understand the role of a carbon labelling scheme in the action of combating global climate change.
To answer the research questions, we develop a manufacturer–retailer decision-making model where
the manufacturer plays the role of Stackelberg leader, and the retailer is a follower in the supply
chain. Both are independent decision makers and make their own decisions targeted at maximizing
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in Figure 1, is as follows. Next, we will develop and analyse three different game models in three
subsections, respectively.
(1) The decision-making model without considering a carbon labelling scheme (denoted Model NL);
(2) The manufacturer is subject to a carbon labelling scheme (denoted Model LNR);
(3) Themanufacturer invests in carbon footprint reduction tomitigate the impact of a carbon labelling
scheme (denoted Model LR).
Figure 1. The sequence of decision making for the supply chain.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A survey of related literature is presented
in Section 2. Section 3 provides notations and assumption. The model development and analysis for
the three game models are provided in Section 4. In Section 5, we compare the equilibrium results of
the three models. To demonstrate the feasibility of the mathematical models, a numerical example is
analysed in Section 6. We conclude our key findings in Section 7 and highlight possible future work.
2. Literature Review
Most scholars have studied carbon labelling from two perspectives: the impact of a carbon
label scheme on consumer behaviour and the manufacturing decision under an environmental policy.
The traditional economic models follow the utility maximization rule, in which rational consumers will
make purchasing decisions considering constraints such as their personal financial situation if price and
quality are consistent with the products’ utility function. An important assumption is that customers
have full access to complete information about the products’ price and quality [16]. Consumers
may be able to determine product quality attributes such as size and materials through observation.
Products’ credence attributes are difficult to determine. The environmental quality attributes of a product
are typically in the credence category. For example, consumers may not distinguish between production
processes that have different environmental impacts when the final product is the same [17]. Thus,
the role of a carbon label is to turn a credence attribute into a visible attribute so that consumers can
easily compare and make more informed utility-maximizing product choice decisions [18]. In other
words, the carbon labels will provide information to enable consumers to recognize the carbon emissions
created during the production process and will thereby increase the environmental quality of the labelled
goods [17]. In addition, recent research in behavioural economics shows that actors may care about
behavioural utility in addition to economic benefits [19]. Hence, carbon labelling schemes may lead to
social preference by customers and can be used to differentiate the low-carbon intensity products from
normal ones. In sum, labelling may affect the implicit weights that consumers assign to the different
product attributes and, in turn, affect consumer buying behaviour.
From a consumer’s perspective, various researchers examined consumers’ attitudes towards green
or carbon-labelled products and a carbon labelling scheme [20–22]. It is claimed that the higher the
consumers’ environmental preference, the more willing they are to pay higher prices for a low-carbon
product [23]. Zhao and Zhong [24] examined consumers’ responses to carbon-labelled products
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adopting a system dynamics approach and found that public awareness, education level, critical
premium, and perceived consumer effectiveness are the key factors that affect customer purchasing
behaviour. Furthermore, Baddeley et al. [25] revealed that the acceptance of carbon labels depends
mainly on the degree of consumer awareness and the credibility of the carbon labelling scheme.
This revelation is echoed by Upham et al. [26] who conducted an experimental study and revealed
that British consumers have a low willingness to use carbon labels as a reference when making a
purchase. The main reason is that people found it difficult to understand labelled GHG emissions
without additional information. Later, Schaefer and Blanke [27] proposed that an acceptable label must
fulfil six requirements: completeness, transparency, reliability, clarity, availability/accessibility, and
producer incentive. Tan et al. [7] also used a life cycle approach to explore the prospects of the carbon
labelling of raw food products in Singapore and suggested that carbon footprint calculations must be
standardized to avoid providing misleading information to policy makers, retailers, and consumers.
As consumers are the ultimate users of carbon-labelled products, their understanding of carbon
labels and their willingness to pay for low-carbon products are key factors supporting a carbon
labelling scheme. However, with mounting pressures from stakeholders and under more stringent
regulations/legislations, emissions abatement has become an indispensable piece of manufacturers’
production operations which involve production planning and investment in pollution abatement
equipment/systems [28]. The trade-off between environmental practices and profitability has been
emphasized by many authors [29–31], who argue that environmentally friendly behaviour is not
always compatible with the profit-seeking behaviour of the firm, such that the firm must balance the
costs and benefits of environmental investments [32].
In recent years, an increasing number of scholars have investigated optimal production and pricing
decisions under different emissions regulations, mainly focusing on carbon emission taxes and cap
and trade, and found empirical evidence to support the claim that it is necessary for firms to consider
carbon emissions in the design stage of manufacturing to reduce the impact of environmental policy
towards their supply chain [33–35]. Benjaafar et al. [36] reviewed the papers published by INFORMS
and found that operation research of the supply chain considering the emission factors remains in the
early stage; there is a lack of systematic analysis in support of effective production decisions.
The idea of carbon labels would enable consumers to identify products with the smallest carbon
footprints. Producers would then compete to reduce the carbon footprints of their products to benefit
from environmentally sensitive consumer demand. However, improving low-carbon production
often involves more elaborate manufacturing processes that increase the product’s manufacturing
costs. To lower carbon footprints, firms may need to change their production location or invest in
low-carbon manufacturing operations, which may lead to a change in their cost structure. Therefore,
a systematic formulation for analysing cost effectiveness is needed. However, to the best of our
knowledge, there is a lack of research to illustrate how manufacturers and retailers may be affected by
carbon labelling schemes and how the price and profit structure may change if manufacturers make a
low-carbon investment.
It can be observed that previous studies on carbon labelling mainly focused on either consumer
attitudes towards carbon labels or the impacts of carbon labelling schemes on consumers’ purchasing
behaviour using the methods of empirical studies, experimental studies, and surveys. Although a few
studies [37–40] considered that the retailer price has an influence on consumers’ buying behaviour
of carbon-labelled products, the manufacturer’s and retailer’s pricing strategies and the low-carbon
investment decision have not been fully investigated yet.
Our research may be the first model-based paper that considers the impact of a carbon labelling
scheme on the production and pricing decision. We conducted a quantitative economic analysis to
examine the impact of a carbon labelling scheme on the manufacturer’s and retailer’s pricing strategies,
the product carbon footprint decision, the consumer demand for the carbon-labelled products, the total
carbon emissions, and their profits. We use a Stackelberg game [41–43] because it helps us to know
the analytical expression of the manufacturing firm’s and the retailer’s optimal decisions, and the
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Stackelberg game has been widely used to study the decision-making behaviours in the supply
chain [44–46]. As noted by Benjaafar et al. [36], the models-based research could be beneficial to
understanding how accounting for carbon emissions may affect operational decisions across the
supply chain. Our work’s objective is to contribute to the burgeoning literature on green supply chain
decisions considering consumer environmental awareness.
3. Problem Notations and Assumption
In this paper, we focus on a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, denoted
by M (referred to as “he”), and one retailer, denoted by R (referred to as “she”). The manufacturer
produces only one product, and the retailer sells only the product produced by the manufacturer.
Under a carbon labelling scheme, both the manufacturer and the retailer decide the optimal price and
quantity to maximize the product’s expected profit, and the manufacturer must further decide if it will
invest in green production to reduce the product’s carbon footprint. The assumptions in modelling are
as follows:
Assumption 1. For simplicity but without loss of information, we assume that the manufacturer plays the role
of Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a follower in the supply chain. Both are independent decision makers and
make their own decisions targeting the maximizing of their individual profit.
Assumption 2. Under the carbon labelling scheme, the manufacturer attempts to reduce the initial product
carbon footprint “ f0” to a level “ f ” (0 ≤ f ≤ f0) by adopting the cleaner technologies. The extra cost
K( f0 − f )2 will incur, where “K” represents an investment parameter that determines the magnitude of the
cost involved in making an investment, which is similar to the study of Yalabik and Fairchild [32]. From the
quadratic form, we note that the smaller the product carbon footprint (PCF) “ f ” displayed on the product label,
the more the manufacturer needs to invest in carbon reduction, which leads to extra production costs.
Assumption 3. After a government has implemented carbon labelling scheme, the market demand for
the carbon-labelled product with/without investment in carbon footprint reduction can be expressed by
D = a − bp − β f and D = a − bp − β f0 respectively, where “β” represents the sensitivity of consumers
to the product carbon footprint. Here, we can interpret “β” as the consumer environmental-awareness level.
We capture the impact of consumer environmental awareness and product carbon footprint on consumer demand
in a tractable deterministic linear form. This form reflects that market demand will decrease as the product carbon
footprint increases.
To develop the proposed models, we summarize the model parameters and decision variables in
Table 1. The superscript * is used to indicate optimality whenever necessary. Additional notations will
be provided when needed.
Table 1. Symbols and notation.
Symbols and Notation Explanation
w the unit wholesale price, a decision variable
p the unit retail price, a decision variable
f
the product carbon footprint (PCF) after the manufacturer makes an investment in PCF-reduction,
a decision variable
D the market demand
a the basic market scale of consumers
b the sensitivity of demand to the retailer’s price
c the unit production cost
f0 the initial product carbon footprint before the manufacturer makes an investment in PCF-reduction
β
the sensitivity of consumers to the PCF, here we can interpret it as the consumer
environmental-awareness level
K the cost factor when the manufacturer makes an investment in PCF-reduction
E total carbon emissions
Π the manufacturer’s profit
pi the retailer’s profit
To avoid triviality, we assume that a > c > 0, p > w > c, and 0 ≤ f ≤ f0.
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4. Analytical Models
4.1. Manufacturer and Retailer Pricing Decisions without a Carbon Labelling Scheme (Model NL)
For the case without a carbon labelling scheme, the manufacturer determines the wholesale price
“w” and the retailer decides the retail price “p” of the product. Hence, the profit functions of the
manufacturer and retailer are:
M : Max
w
ΠNL = (w− c)(a− bp) (1)
R : Max
p
piNL = (p− w)(a− bp) (2)
The expressions are solved to derive the equilibrium values of decision variables.
Theorem 1. In Model NL, the equilibrium wholesale price, the retail price, the market demand, the total carbon
emissions, and the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits are, respectively, given by:
w∗NL =
a+bc
2b , p
∗
NL =
3a+bc
4b , D
∗
NL =
a−bc
4 , E
∗
NL =
(a−bc) f0
4 , Π
∗
NL =
(a−bc)2
8b , pi
∗
NL =
(a−bc)2
16b .
Proof. See Appendix A. 
4.2. Manufacturer and Retailer’s Pricing Decisions with Carbon Labelling Scheme (Model LNR)
In this section, we consider the scenario where a government introduced a carbon labelling
scheme, while the manufacturer does not make an investment in product carbon-footprint reduction
and only displays the initial product carbon footprint “ f0” on the product label. The manufacturer
determines the wholesale price “w”; the retailer decides the retail price “p” of the product. The decision
sequence is the same as that considered in Section 4.1 except that the initial product carbon footprint
“ f0” will affect the market demand. Therefore, to maximize the profits, the manufacturer’s and
retailer’s decision problems can be formulated as follows:
M : Max
w
ΠLNR = (w− c)(a− bp− β f0) (3)
R : Max
P
piLNR = (p− w)(a− bp− β f0) (4)
To obtain the manufacturer’s and retailer’s equilibrium decisions, we use backward induction
and obtain Theorem 2, as follows. For simplicity, we divide the decision regions into two areas:
(1) LNR-A (i.e., f0 < (a− bc)/β),
(2) LNR-B (i.e., f0 ≥ (a− bc)/β), which can be viewed as a function of “β” and “ f0” and is shown in
Figure 2.
β0
LNR-B
LNR-A
0f
0
a bc
f β
−
=
β
Ƒ
Ƒ
β
Figure 2. The decision regions for the chain members in the LNR model.
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Theorem 2. In Model LNR, the equilibrium wholesale price, the retail price, the market demand, the total carbon
emissions, and the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits are, respectively, given by:
(1) In region LNR-A,
w∗LNR-A =
a+bc−β f0
2b , p
∗
LNR-A =
3a+bc−3β f0
4b , D
∗
LNR-A =
a−bc−β f0
4 , E
∗
LNR-A =
(a−bc−β f0) f0
4 ,
Π
∗
LNR-A =
(a−bc−β f0)2
8b , pi
∗
LNR-A =
(a−bc−β f0)2
16b ;
(2) To ensure positive market demand, the initial product carbon footprint must satisfy f0 < (a− bc)/β.
Therefore, in region LNR-B where f0 ≥ (a− bc)/β, the market demand is zero, which means the supply
chain members exit the market. This occurs because consumer environmental awareness is very high and
the product with high initial carbon footprint will be rejected from the market.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
From Theorem 2, with an increasing environmental consciousness, when the initial carbon
footprint of the product is greater than a threshold value ( f0 = (a− bc)/β), the market demand for
these products declines quickly, even coming close to zero; then, the supply chain members exit the
market in region LNR-B. Therefore, we only discuss the effects of consumers’ environmental awareness
on the equilibriumwholesale price, the retail price, the market demand, the total carbon emissions, and
the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits in region LNR-A, and we obtain the following Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. In region LNR-A, ∂w∗LNR-A/∂β < 0, ∂p
∗
LNR-A/∂β < 0, ∂D
∗
LNR-A/∂β < 0, ∂E
∗
LNR-A/∂β < 0,
∂Π∗LNR-A/∂β < 0, ∂pi∗LNR-A/∂β < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Corollary 1 shows that, if the manufacturer does not make an investment in the product
carbon-footprint reduction, with an increased consumer environmental awareness, both the
manufacturer and the retailer should lower the wholesale price and retail price. The market demand,
the total carbon emissions, the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits will decrease in region LNR-A
where the initial carbon footprint of the product is lower than a threshold value ( f0 = (a− bc)/β).
4.3. Manufacturer and Retailer Pricing and PCF-Reduction Investment Decisions with a Carbon Labelling
Scheme (Model LR)
Under this scenario, the manufacturer determines the product carbon footprint “ f ” and wholesale
price “w,” and the retailer decides the retail price “p” of the product. Hence, the manufacturer’s and
the retailer’s decisions can be formulated as follows:
M :
Max
w, f
ΠLR = (w− c)(a− bp− β f )− K( f0 − f )2
s.t. 0 ≤ f ≤ f0
(5)
R : Max
p
piLR = (p− w)(a− bp− β f ) (6)
To obtain the manufacturer’s and retailer’s equilibrium decisions, we also use backward induction
and obtain Proposition 3, as follows. For simplicity, we divide the decision regions into five parts:
(1) LR-1-A (i.e., β < 2
√
2Kb, f0 < β(a− bc)/8Kb),
(2) LR-1-B (i.e., β < 2
√
2Kb, β(a− bc)/8Kb ≤ f0 ≤ (a− bc)/β),
(3) LR-1-C (i.e., β < 2
√
2Kb, f0 > (a− bc)/β),
(4) LR-2-A (i.e., β ≥ 2√2Kb, f0 < (a− bc)/2
√
2Kb), and
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(5) LR-2-B (i.e., β ≥ 2√2Kb, f0 ≥ (a− bc)/2
√
2Kb), which can be viewed as a function of “β” and
“ f0” and shown in Figure 3.
β0
LR-2-B
0f
0
a bc
f β
−
=
LR-2-A 0
a bc
f β
−
=
LR-1-B
LR-1-C
LR-1-A
( )
8
a bc
Kb
β −
2 2Kb
0 ( ) 2 2f a bc Kb= −
Figure 3. The decision regions for the chain members in the LR model.
Theorem 3. In Model LR, the equilibrium wholesale price, the product carbon footprint, the retail price,
the market demand, the total carbon emissions, and the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits are, respectively,
given by:
(1) In region LR-1-A and region LR-2-A,
w∗LR-1-A = w
∗
LR-2-A =
a+bc
2b , f
∗
LR-1-A = f
∗
LR-2-A = 0, p
∗
LR-1-A = p
∗
LR-2-A =
3a+bc
4b ,
D∗LR-1-A = D
∗
LR-2-A =
a−bc
4 , E
∗
LR-1-A = E
∗
LR-2-A = 0, Π
∗
LR-1-A = Π
∗
LR-2-A =
(a−bc)2
8b − K f02,
pi∗LR-1-A = pi
∗
LR-2-A =
(a−bc)2
16b ;
(2) In region LR-1-B,
w∗LR-1-B =
4K(a+bc−β f0)−β2c
8Kb−β2 , f
∗
LR-1-B =
8Kb f0−β(a−bc)
8Kb−β2 , p
∗
LR-1-B =
2K(3a+bc−3β f0)−β2c
8Kb−β2 ,
D∗LR-1-B =
2Kb(a−bc−β f0)
8Kb−β2 , E
∗
LR-1-B =
2Kb(a−bc−β f0)[8Kb f0−β(a−bc)]
(8Kb−β2)2 ,
Π
∗
LR-1-B =
K(a−bc−β f0)2
8Kb−β2 , pi
∗
LR-1-B =
4K2b(a−bc−β f0)2
(8Kb−β2)2 ;
(3) In region LR-1-C and region LR-2-B, the supply chain members exit the market.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
According to Theorem 3, we note that the supply chain members’ equilibrium decisions in regions
LR-1-A and LR-2-A are not influenced by consumer environmental awareness. The supply chain
members exit the market because the market demand is negative in regions LR-1-C and LR-2-B.
Therefore, we only discuss the impacts of consumer environmental awareness on the supply chain
members’ equilibrium decisions in region LR-1-B and obtain the following Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. In region LR-1-B,
(1) Only when f0 < 2β(a− bc)/(8Kb+ β2), ∂w∗LR-1-B/∂β > 0, ∂p∗LR-1-B/∂β > 0, ∂D∗LR-1-B/∂β > 0,
∂pi∗LR-1-B/∂β > 0. Otherwise, ∂w
∗
LR-1-B/∂β < 0, ∂p
∗
LR-1-B/∂β < 0, ∂D
∗
LR-1-B/∂β < 0, ∂pi
∗
LR-1-B/∂β < 0;
(2) Only when f0 < (a− bc)(8Kb+ β2)/16Kbβ, ∂ f ∗LR-1-B/∂β < 0. Otherwise, ∂ f ∗LR-1-B/∂β > 0;
(3) Only when f0 < β(a− bc)/8Kb, ∂Π∗LR-1-B/∂β > 0. Otherwise, ∂Π∗LR-1-B/∂β < 0.
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Proof. See Appendix A. 
Corollary 2 shows that, if the manufacturer makes a PCF-reduction investment in region
LR-1-B, both the manufacturer and the retailer should raise their prices with increased consumer
environmental awareness when the initial product carbon footprint is relatively small (i.e.,
f0 < 2β(a− bc)/(8Kb+ β2)); the market demand and retailer’s profits will consequently increase.
However, when the initial product carbon footprint is relatively large (i.e., f0 > 2β(a− bc)/(8Kb+ β2)),
the manufacturer and retailer should lower their prices with an increased consumer environmental
awareness; market demand and the retailer’s profits will consequently decrease. In addition, when the
initial product carbon footprint is relatively small (i.e., f0 < (a− bc)(8Kb+ β2)/16Kbβ), the product
carbon footprint will be reduced after the manufacturer makes a PCF-reduction investment. However,
when the initial product carbon footprint is relatively large (i.e., f0 > (a− bc)(8Kb+ β2)/16Kbβ),
the product carbon footprint will be increased after the manufacturer makes a PCF-reduction
investment. When the initial product carbon footprint is relatively small (i.e., f0 < β(a− bc)/8Kb), the
manufacturer’s profits will increase. However, when the initial product carbon footprint is relatively
large (i.e., f0 > β(a− bc)/8Kb), the manufacturer’s profits will decrease with an increased consumer
environmental awareness.
5. Comparisons of the Equilibrium Outcomes among the Three Models
In the previous section, we derived the equilibrium decisions for the supply chain members
within the three game models considered in this paper. In this section, we will compare the equilibrium
outcomes, the wholesale price, the retail price, the market demand, the total carbon emissions, and
the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits, and investigate what occurs after the government has
implemented a carbon labelling scheme. Additionally, what changes occur if the manufacturer makes
an investment in PCF-reduction under a carbon labelling scheme? New and interesting findings will
be presented.
5.1. Model LNR vs. Model NL
First, we compare the equilibrium decisions between Model LNR and Model NL to identify what
occurs after the government has implemented a carbon labelling scheme; however, the manufacturer
does not make an investment in PCF-reduction.
Proposition 1. Compared to Model NL, Model LNR yields
(1) When f0 < (a− bc)/β, w∗LNR < w∗NL, p∗LNR < p∗NL, D∗LNR < D∗NL, E∗LNR < E∗NL, Π∗LNR < Π∗NL and
pi∗LNR < pi
∗
NL;
(2) When f0 ≥ (a− bc)/β, the chain members exit the market.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Proposition 1 shows that, if the manufacturer does not make an investment in PCF-reduction
under the carbon labelling scheme:
(1) When the initial product carbon footprint is smaller than the threshold value ( f0 < (a− bc)/β),
the optimal wholesale price, the retail price, the market demand, the total carbon emissions, and
the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits are lower than those without a carbon labelling scheme.
(2) When the initial product carbon footprint is larger than the threshold value ( f0 ≥ (a− bc)/β),
the chain members exit the market.
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5.2. Model LR vs. Model LNR
By comparing the equilibrium decisions between Model LR and Model LNR, we can identify
what changes occur after the manufacturer makes an investment in PCF-reduction under a carbon
labelling scheme.
Proposition 2. Compared to Model LNR, Model LR yields
(1) When β < 2
√
Kb and f0 < β(a− bc)/8Kb, or β ≥ 2
√
Kb and f0 < (a− bc)/2
√
2Kb,
w∗LR > w
∗
LNR, p
∗
LR > p
∗
LNR, D
∗
LR > D
∗
LNR, E
∗
LR < E
∗
LNR, Π
∗
LR > Π
∗
LNR, pi
∗
LR > pi
∗
LNR;
(2) When β < 2
√
Kb and β(a− bc)/8Kb ≤ f0 ≤ (a− bc)/β,
w∗LR > w
∗
LNR, p
∗
LR > p
∗
LNR, D
∗
LR > D
∗
LNR, E
∗
LR > (<)E
∗
LNR
1©, Π∗LR > Π
∗
LNR, pi
∗
LR > pi
∗
LNR;
Note 1©: When f0 < 8Kb(a− bc)/β(16Kb− β2), E∗LR < E∗LNR, otherwise E∗LR > E∗LNR.
(3) When β ≥ 2√Kb and (a− bc)/β < f0 < (a− bc)/2
√
2Kb, the chain members will not exit the market.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Proposition 2 shows that, under a carbon labelling scheme, if the manufacturer makes an
investment in PCF-reduction:
(1) When the initial product carbon footprint and the level of consumer environmental awareness
are relatively small ( f0 < β(a− bc)/8Kb and β < 2
√
Kb) or the initial product carbon footprint
is relatively small ( f0 < (a− bc)/2
√
2Kb) and the level of consumer environmental awareness
is relatively high (β ≥ 2√Kb), both the manufacturer and the retailer can raise their prices.
The market demands and the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits will be increased relative to
the scenario without investment in PCF-reduction, and total carbon emissions will be reduced
because of the manufacturer’s investment in PCF-reduction.
(2) When the initial product carbon footprint is intermediate (β(a− bc)/8Kb ≤ f0 ≤ (a− bc)/β)
and the level of consumer environmental awareness is relatively small (β < 2
√
Kb), both
the manufacturer and the retailer can raise their prices. The market demand and the
manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits will be increased relative to the situation without investment
in PCF-reduction. When the initial product carbon footprint is relatively small, total carbon
emissions will be reduced; otherwise, total carbon emissions will be increased.
(3) When the level of consumers’ environmental awareness is relatively high (β ≥ 2√Kb) and the
initial product carbon footprint is intermediate ((a− bc)/β < f0 < (a− bc)/2
√
2Kb), the chain
members will not exit the market.
6. Numerical Examples
In this section, we present numerical examples to illustrate the theoretical results regarding the
impacts of a carbon labelling scheme on the manufacturer’s and retailer’s equilibrium outcomes and
investigate how consumers’ environmental awareness influences their optimal decisions, which is
shown in Table 2. To confirm the feasibility of the proposed problem solution, we chose the parameter
values based on the previous assumptions and constraints. Here, let a = 60, b = 1, c = 20, K = 8,
f0 ∈ {0.5, 4.5, 8.5} and β ∈ {1, 4, 7, 10}. Based on these parameters, the equilibrium wholesale price,
the retail price, the market demand, the total carbon emissions, and the manufacturer’s and retailer’s
profits in Model NL are obtained, i.e., w∗NL = 40, p
∗
NL = 50, D
∗
NL = 10, E
∗
NL ∈ {5, 45, 85}, Π∗NL = 200
and pi∗NL = 100. All those values can be viewed as a benchmark to compare with the equilibrium
outcomes in Model LNR and Model LR.
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Table 2. The equilibrium outcomes in Model LNR and Model LR.
Parameters Model LNR Model LR
f0 β w
∗ p∗ D∗ E∗ Π∗ pi∗ w∗ f ∗ p∗ D∗ E∗ Π∗ pi∗
0.5
1 39.8 49.6 9.9 4.9 195 97.5 40 0 50 10 0 198 100
4 39 48.5 9.5 4.8 180.5 90.3 40 0 50 10 0 198 100
7 38.3 47.3 9.1 4.7 166.5 83.3 40 0 50 10 0 198 100
10 37.5 46.3 8.8 4.4 153.1 76.6 40 0 50 10 0 198 100
4.5
1 37.3 46.6 8.9 39.9 157.5 78.8 38. 3.9 47.4 9 40.6 160 81.3
4 31 36.5 5.5 24.8 60.5 30.3 34.8 2.7 42 5.5 14.7 80.7 53.8
7 24.3 26.4 2.1 9.6 9 4.5 38.1 0.5 47.2 9.1 4.8 38.5 82.3
10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 40 0 50 10 0 198 100
8.5
1 35.8 43.6 7.9 66.9 124 62 36 8 44 8 64 126 64
4 23 24.5 1.5 12.8 4.5 2.3 24 8 26 2 16 6 4
7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Note: N/A denotes that the chain members exit the market.
From Table 2, we can obtain the following observations and insights:
(1) In Model LNR (the manufacturer does not make an investment in PCF-reduction under
a carbon labelling scheme), when the initial product carbon footprint or the level of consumer
environmental awareness is relatively small (lower), the equilibrium wholesale price, the retail
price, the market demand, the total carbon emissions, and the manufacturer’s and retailer’s
profits will decrease with increasing consumer environmental awareness; otherwise, the chain
members will exit the market.
(2) In Model LR (the manufacturer makes an investment in PCF-reduction under a carbon labelling
scheme), when the initial product carbon footprint is very small, the equilibrium wholesale price,
the retail price, the market demand, and the retailer’s profits are the same as the equilibrium
outcomes in Model NL (no carbon labelling). In addition, the product carbon footprint and the
total carbon emissions are reduced to zero, and themanufacturer’s profit is reduced slightly owing
to the investment in PCF-reduction; however, it is higher than that of Model NL. Interestingly,
when the initial product carbon footprint is at the intermediate level and the level of consumer
environmental awareness is very high, the equilibrium outcomes are the same as when the initial
product carbon footprint is very small. More importantly, the chain members do not exit the
market, in contrast to Model LNR. However, when the initial product carbon footprint and the
level of consumer environmental awareness is very large (high), the chain members also exit
the market.
(3) Total carbon emissions in Model LNR and Model LNR are lower than that in Model NL, which
means that total carbon emissions will decrease after the government implements the carbon
labelling scheme, regardless of whether the manufacturer makes an investment in PCF-reduction.
(4) Compared to Model NL, the manufacturer’s profit will surely decrease and the retailer’s profit
may or may not decrease after the government implements the carbon labelling scheme.
7. Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
A carbon labelling scheme is often supported by businesses and/or government, and it attempts
to guide consumers to purchase and use those products that have smaller carbon footprints. To explore
the impacts of a carbon labelling scheme on the manufacturer’s and retailer’s optimal decision-making
and its contribution towards carbon emissions reduction, this paper develops three decision models
by applying game theory. This paper also derives certain equilibrium decisions for the supply chain
under different levels of consumer environmental awareness. By analysing the influence of a carbon
labelling scheme on the manufacturer’s and retailer’s optimal decisions, total carbon emissions and
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profits, and comparing these with the situation in which the manufacturer makes a PCF-reduction
investment, we identify three main findings:
(1) Regardless of whether or not the manufacturer makes an investment in PCF-reduction under the
carbon labelling scheme, the total carbon emissions are lower than without the carbon labelling
scheme. The conclusion may illustrate the role of a carbon labelling scheme in combating
global climate change. Furthermore, the total carbon emissions are highly related to consumer
environmental awareness.
(2) Under a carbon labelling scheme, the manufacturer’s and retailer’s optimal decisions depend on
two critical values (the initial product carbon footprint and the level of consumer environmental
awareness). Given that the manufacturer makes an investment in PCF-reduction, when the
initial product carbon footprint is very small, the product carbon footprint can be reduced to
near zero, and the optimal pricing strategies can remain the same as the benchmark without
a carbon labelling scheme. When the initial product carbon footprint is intermediate and the
consumer environmental-awareness level is relatively low, both should also lower their prices.
In addition, there is a threshold. When the initial product carbon footprint is smaller than the
threshold, the product carbon footprint will decrease with increasing consumer environmental
awareness, However, when the initial product carbon footprint is larger than the threshold
( f0 > (a− bc)(8Kb+ β2)/16Kbβ), the product carbon footprint will be increased with increasing
consumer environmental awareness.
(3) Under a carbon labelling scheme, the manufacturer’s profit is lower than without the carbon
labelling scheme. In addition, the retailer’s profit under the carbon labelling scheme may remain
unchanged or be lower than without the carbon labelling scheme; this will depend on whether
the manufacturer makes an investment in PCF-reduction. This conclusion may explain why the
voices of the retailers participating in carbon labelling schemes have been louder than those of
the manufacturers in the years since carbon labelling schemes have been implemented.
We have made several contributions to the literature. First, our most significant contribution to the
literature is that we have developed specific analytic expressions for two key decision variables under
the carbon labelling scheme—pricing and the product carbon footprint—while considering the role of
consumer environmental awareness. Second, this paper extends the PCF-reduction investment decision
results of Yenipazarli [28] to a supply chain level where consumers’ environmental awareness is
considered. Third, this paper enriches the experimental studies of Baddeley et al. [25] and Hartikainen
et al. [39] regarding consumer purchase behaviour towards carbon labels. Specifically, in our paper, we
have discussed the manufacturer’s and retailer’s pricing strategies for carbon-labelled products using
the theoretical models and have provided a better interpretation of the important role of consumer
environmental awareness in spurring the manufacturers to reduce carbon footprints under a carbon
labelling scheme.
The paper also has practical implications. First, it is important to educate the public to increase
environmental awareness and encourage them to purchase more low-carbon products to curb carbon
emissions. In turn, the paper will also stimulate manufacturers to make investments in PCF-reduction
and engage in more low-carbon production. Second, retailers should sell products with lower carbon
footprints and strategically adjust the retail price of carbon-labelled products, such that they can make
more profit by increasing consumer environmental awareness. In addition, the retailers should attempt
to encourage the manufacturers to implement PCF-reduction strategies to achieve additional profits
for both.
However, our work has certain limitations and can be extended in several directions. It is worth
noting that the demand is assumed to be deterministic, and deterministic models do not consider
the cost associated with supply and demand uncertainty. One future extension is to investigate
the problem by using stochastic models. Another extension of our work can incorporate market
competition, i.e., one supply chain competes with another supply chain. It will be interesting to
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explore how market competition would affect the manufacturers’ and retailers’ decisions and their
performances under a carbon labelling scheme. Third, this paper focuses mainly on theoretical models
and analysis. Empirical research could be developed in the future that would corroborate the results
obtained from modelling and provide more valuable contributions to the literature in this area.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1. In Model NL, we first solve for the retailer’s profit Function (2). According to
∂2piNL/∂p
2 = −2b < 0 and the first order condition, ∂piNL/∂p = a− 2bp+ bw = 0, we obtain the
retailer’s price reaction function p = (a+ bw)/2b. 
Second, solving for the manufacturer’s profit Function (1), we substitute the value of p into (1) and
derive ΠNL = (w− c)(a− bw)/2. According to ∂2ΠNL/∂w2 = −b < 0 and equating the first order
condition to zero, that is ∂ΠNL/∂w = (a− 2bw+ bc)/2 = 0, we obtain the manufacturer’s optimal
price w∗NL = (a+ bc)/2b.
Substituting the value of w∗NL into the value of p, the optimal retail price is obtained as
p∗NL = (3a+ bc)/4b. From the above equilibrium values, we derive the market demand, the total
carbon emissions, and the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits.
Proof of Theorem 2. In Model LNR, we first solve for the retailer’s profit Function (4). According to
∂2piLNR/∂p
2 = −2b < 0 and equating the first order condition to zero, that is ∂piLNR/∂p = a− 2bp+
bw− β f0 = 0, we obtain p = (a+ bw− β f0)/2b. 
Second, solving for the manufacturer’s profit Function (3), we substitute the value of p into (1)
and derive ΠLNR = (w− c)(a− bw− β f0)/2. According to ∂2ΠLNR/∂w2 = −b < 0 and equating
the first order condition to zero, that is ∂ΠLNR/∂w = (a− 2bw+ bc− β f0)/2 = 0, we obtain the
manufacturer’s optimal price w∗LNR = (a+ bc− β f0)/2b. Substituting the value of w∗LNR into the value
of p, the optimal retail price is obtained as p∗LNR = (3a+ bc− 3β f0)/4b.
However, we note that D∗LNR = (a− bp− β f0)/4. To ensure the market demand is positive, the
initial product carbon footprint must satisfy f0 < (a− bc)/β. From the above equilibrium values, we
derive the total carbon emissions and the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits.
Proof of Corollary 1. From Proposition 2 (1), taking the first order partial derivatives of the equilibrium
outcomes with respect to β, we have
∂w∗LNR-A/∂β = − f0/2b < 0, ∂p∗LNR-A/∂β = −3 f0/4b < 0, ∂D∗LNR-A/∂β = − f0/4 < 0,
∂E∗LNR-A/∂β = − f02/4 < 0, ∂Π∗LNR-A/∂β = − f0(a− bc− β f0)/4b,
∂pi∗LNR-A/∂β = − f0(a− bc− β f0)/8b. Since f0 < (a− bc)/β, ∂Π∗LNR-A/∂β < 0, ∂pi∗LNR-A/∂β < 0. 
Proof of Theorem 3. In Model LR, we first solve for the retailer’s profit Function (6). According to
∂2piLR/∂p
2 = −2b < 0 and equating the first order condition to zero, that is ∂piLR/∂p = a− 2bp+
bw− β f = 0, we obtain pLR = (a+ bw− β f )/2b. 
Second, solving for the manufacturer’s profit Function (5), we substitute the value of p into (1)
and derive ΠLR = (w− c)(a− bw− β f )/2− K( f0 − f )2.
Sustainability 2018, 10, 1238 14 of 17
According to ∂2ΠLR/∂w
2 = −b < 0 and equating the first order condition to 0, that is
∂ΠLR/∂w = (a− 2bw+ bc− β f )/2 = 0, we obtain wLR = (a+ bc− β f )/2b and substitute it into
ΠLR, then ΠLR = (a− bc− β f )2/8b− K( f0 − f )2.
Taking the derivatives of the above with respect to f , we obtain
∂ΠLR/∂ f = 2K( f0 − f )− β(a− bc− β f )/4b and ∂2ΠLR/∂ f 2 = β2/4b− 2K.
From the second derivative, we note ∂2ΠLR/∂ f
2
< 0 when β < 2
√
2Kb; then ΠLR can attain the
maximum value at ∂ΠLR/∂ f = 0, that is f = [8Kb f0 − β(a− bc)]/(8Kb− β2).
However, ∂2ΠLR/∂ f
2 ≥ 0 when β ≥ 2√2Kb, then ΠLR can attain the minimum value at f and
perhaps attain the maximum value at f = 0 or f = f0.
Therefore, we consider the two cases separately:
(1) When β < 2
√
2Kb, to ensure 0 ≤ f ≤ f0, we obtain β(a− bc)/8Kb ≤ f0 ≤ (a− bc)/β; therefore,
the optimal product carbon footprint f ∗LR = f . Substituting this equation into wLR, we obtain the
optimal wholesale price w∗LR = [4K(a+ bc− β f0)− β2c]/(8Kb− β2). Substituting both into pLR,
we obtain p∗LR = [2K(3a+ bc− 3β f0)− β2c]/(8Kb− β2). If f < 0, that is f0 < β(a− bc)/8Kb,
the optimal product carbon footprint f ∗LR = 0, w
∗
LR = (a+ bc)/2b, and p
∗
LR = (3a+ bc)/4b.
If f > f0, that is f0 > (a− bc)/β, the optimal product carbon footprint f ∗LR = f0. However,
the market demand is negative under this condition; therefore, the chain members must exit
the market.
(2) When β ≥ 2√2Kb, if f = 0, then ΠLR = (a− bc)2/8b − K f02; if f = f0, then
ΠLR = (a− bc− β f0)2/8b. Furthermore, comparing the two profit functions, we note that
(a− bc)2/8b−K f02 > (a− bc− β f0)2/8b; therefore, ΠLR can attain the maximum value at f = 0
and when f0 < (a− bc)/2
√
2Kb. Otherwise, the manufacturer’s profit is negative, and the chain
members must exit the market.
Proof of Corollary 2. From Proposition 3 (2), taking the first order partial derivatives of the equilibrium
outcomes with respect to β, we can obtain that
∂w∗LR-1-B/∂β = 4K[2β(a− bc)− (8Kb+ β2) f0]/(8Kb− β2)
2
,
∂p∗LR-1-B/∂β = 6K[2β(a− bc)− (8Kb+ β2) f0]/(8Kb− β2)
2
,
D∗LR-1-B/∂β = 2Kb[2β(a− bc)− (8Kb+ β2) f0]/(8Kb− β2)
2
,
∂pi∗LR-1-B/∂β = 8K
2b(8Kb− β2)(a− bc− β f0)[2β(a− bc)− (8Kb+ β2) f0]/(8Kb− β2)2. 
From these equations, we note that, when f0 < 2β(a− bc)/(8Kb+ β2), ∂w∗LR-1-B/∂β > 0,
∂p∗LR-1-B/∂β > 0, ∂D
∗
LR-1-B/∂β > 0, ∂pi
∗
LR-1-B/∂β > 0; otherwise, ∂w
∗
LR-1-B/∂β < 0, ∂p
∗
LR-1-B/∂β < 0,
∂D∗LR-1-B/∂β < 0, ∂pi
∗
LR-1-B/∂β < 0.
In addition, we can obtain that ∂ f ∗LR-1-B/∂β = [16Kbβ f0 − (a− bc)(8Kb+ β2)]/(8Kb− β2)
2
.
We find that, only if f0 < (a− bc)(8Kb+ β2)/16Kbβ, then ∂ f ∗LR-1-B/∂β < 0; otherwise, ∂ f ∗LR-1-B/∂β > 0.
Taking the first order partial derivatives of ∂Π∗LR-1-B with respect to β, we obtain that
∂Π∗LR-1-B/∂β = 2K(a− bc− β f0)[β(a− bc)− 8Kbf0]/(8Kb− β2)2 and note that, when f0 < β(a− bc)/8Kb,
∂Π∗LR-1-B/∂β > 0. Otherwise, ∂Π
∗
LR-1-B/∂β < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. Comparing Theorem 2 and Theorem 1, we have
w∗LNR-A − w∗NL = −β f0/2b < 0,p∗LNR-A − p∗NL = −3β f0/4b < 0,D∗LNR-A − D∗NL = −β f0/4 < 0,
E∗LNR-A − E∗NL = −β f02/4 < 0, Π∗LNR-A −Π∗NL = −β f0[2(a− bc)− β f0]/8b, and
pi∗LNR-A − pi∗NL = −β f0[2(a− bc)− β f0]/16b. 
Since f0 < (a− bc)/β, we note that 2(a− bc)− β f0 > 0.
Thus, we have Π∗LNR-A −Π∗NL < 0, pi∗LNR-A − pi∗NL < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Comparing proposition 3 and proposition 2, we have
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(1) w∗LR-1-A − w∗LNR-A = β f0/2b > 0, p∗LR-1-A − p∗LNR-A = 3β f0/4b > 0, D∗LR-1-A − D∗LNR-A = β f0/4 > 0,
E∗LR-1-A − E∗LNR-A = −(a− bc− β f0) f0/4 < 0, Π∗LR-1-A −Π∗LNR-A = [2β(a− bc)− (8Kb+ β2) f0] f0/8b > 0,
pi∗LR-1-A − pi∗LNR-A = [2(a− bc)− β f0]β f0/16 > 0;
(2) w∗LR-1-B − w∗LNR-A = β2(a− bc− β f0)/2b(8Kb− β2) > 0,
p∗LR-1-B − p∗LNR-A = 3β2(a− bc− β f0)/4b(8Kb− β2) > 0,
D∗LR-1-B − D∗LNR-A = β2(a− bc− β f0)/4(8Kb− β2) > 0,
E∗LR-1-B − E∗LNR-A = (a− bc− β f0)[β2 f0(8Kb− β2)− 8Kbβ(a− bc− β f0)]/4(8Kb− β2)
2
. 
It is easily shown that, when f0 < 8Kb(a− bc)/β(16Kb− β2), E∗LR-1-B < E∗LNR-A; otherwise,
E∗LR-1-B > E
∗
LNR-A.
In addition, we can obtain Π∗LR-1-B − Π∗LNR-A = β2(a− bc− β f0)2/8b(8Kb− β2) > 0, and
pi∗LR-1-B − pi∗LNR-A = β2(a− bc− β f0)2(16Kb− β2)/16b(8Kb− β2) > 0.
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